The Faroese Effort Quota Management System by Grétarsson, Helgi & Danielsen, Rannvá
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Abstract: This article puts forward an analysis of the eﬀort quota management 
system that has regulated the valuable demersal ﬁsh stocks within Faroese 
maritime territory since 1996. The article outlines key issues related to Faroese 
domestic ﬁsheries management and the eﬀectiveness of the eﬀort quota man-
agement system. A combined legal and policy analysis reveals that the present 
entry/exit permit system has failed to restrain eﬀort capacity. Most importantly, 
demersal ﬁsh stocks are in decline and as a result the domestic ﬁshing ﬂeet is 
not performing well ﬁnancially. Current permits are due to expire in 2018 but 
Faroese policy-makers still have wide latitude to alter the current management 
system or even adopt a new one.
Key words: Fisheries management, input controls, effort fishing quotas, sover-
eignty and property rights.
the faroese effort quota management system
101
1 Introduction1
The Faroe Islands2 are a self-governing territory within the Kingdom of Denmark 
with a centuries-old and on-going reliance on marine fishing. In 2012, the com-
bined export value of demersal fish products and pelagic products accounted for 
48 % of total exports.3 Additionally, harvesting and processing marine fish stocks 
is a considerable source of employment, and represents a significant share of the 
annual gross domestic product (GDP).4
Marine fishing in the Faroe Islands is as much an industry as it is a way of life. 
Many people own small fishing vessels and fish for personal consumption, and 
most Faroese feel they have an inherent right to utilise the resources of the ocean 
that surrounds them as they have done for centuries. The imposition of strict access 
barriers to the utilisation of these resources, whether for commercial purposes or 
otherwise, is a politically sensitive topic in the Faroe Islands.
Due to the vital economic and social significance of marine fishing, it is im-
portant to understand how the Faroese manage their fisheries, and why this has 
both practical and academic importance. This article focuses on the comprehen-
sive effort quota system that has been in force since 1996 to manage the valuable 
demersal fish stocks within the Faroese maritime territory.
The management system will be approached from a legal point of view but we 
also examine whether it achieves its declared policy objectives. Combining the two 
subjects of the article requires that certain basic premises be set out that generally 
apply in the field of domestic fisheries policy. As such, the main contribution of the 
article is to grasp the realities behind the management of demersal fisheries within 
the Faroese maritime territory. Further to this is a brief analysis of whether there 
are any significant barriers against radical alteration of the Faroese effort quota 
management system or even to adopting a new one. This issue is both timely and 
pertinent since a review process of the Faroese fisheries legislation commenced in 
May 2012 and is still on-going.5
1. The research fund of law students at the University of Iceland (Icelandic: Fræðasjóður Úlfljóts) 
provided the authors with a 200,000 Icelandic Krona grant to complete this article. Any 
opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in the article are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the aforementioned research fund.
2. This small country is an archipelago consisting of 18 islands inhabited by approx. 48,000 
people, covering 1,400 km² of land and 274,000 km² of sea, located in the northeast Atlantic.
3. See Hagstova Føroya 2013. The combined value of demersal and pelagic merchandise exports 
was DKK 2.6 billion.
4. See for instance Búskaparráðið 2011 p. 10; Hansen and Jákupsstovu 2010 p. 14.
5. See Fiskimálaráðið 2012b: Skipan av arbeiðinum. The review process was still underway when 
the authors submitted the article (November 2013).
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In this article, the basic legal and policy issues in domestic fisheries manage-
ment are examined, illustrating some benefit but mainly the costs of a typical ef-
fort quota management system (Section 2). Next, the legal and policy basis of the 
Faroese effort quota management system is described in Section 3. In Section 4, 
an analysis is presented on what kind of legal, practical, and political latitude the 
Faroese legislature has to alter the current management system or, as the case may 
be, to adopt another system altogether. Finally, brief conclusions will be provided 
in Section 5.
2 Domestic fisheries policy – legal and policy issues
2.1 International legal principles
The United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)6 states that the 
sovereignty7 of a coastal state extends into the territorial sea (article 2) and that a 
coastal state has the sovereign right to explore, exploit, conserve and manage liv-
ing and non-living marine resources within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).8 
It therefore follows that a coastal state has exclusive authority to regulate fisheries 
activities within a certain maritime area, usually delimited as 200 nm from so-
called baselines. This exclusive right is limited for several reasons, for instance due 
to environmental concerns (see duty to implement measures to prevent overfish-
ing, article 61 of UNCLOS) and duty of a coastal state to show due regard to the 
interests of other fishing nations (see access to surplus quota for third countries 
within the EEZ, article 62 and 69 of UNCLOS).
In spite of these limitations, the international legal order provides a coastal state 
with wide authority to implement policy within the 200 nm zone “in accordance 
with its own domestic policy and preferences”.9 Therefore, the type of domestic 
fisheries management scheme coastal states adopt is first and foremost a policy 
6. UNCLOS opened for signature on 10 December 1982 in Montego Bay in Jamaica and came 
into force on 16 November 1994.
7. The term ‘sovereignty’ has been defined as having … “two facets: internal sovereignty, that 
is, the supreme authority within the State to make law, and external sovereignty, the legal in-
dependence of the State vis a vis other sovereign States”, cf. Barnes, Richard, Property Rights 
and Natural Resources, p. 222.
8. See provisions 56(1)(a), 61–62 and 69–70 of UNCLOS. In practise coastal states have normally 
excluded other states from fishing within the relevant EEZs or EFZs or, as the case may be, 
coastal states have subjected fishing by foreign states to various strict conditions. Coastal states 
have stronger sovereign rights in regards to fisheries management within the territorial sea, 
cf. provisions 2 and 21 of UNCLOS.
9. McRae and Munro 1989 p. 104.
the faroese effort quota management system
103
question. It is preferable that the chosen scheme be effective to the extent that it 
protects fish stocks and their habitat, and ensures the long-term economic viabil-
ity of commercial fishing industries. Policy analysts, mainly fisheries economists, 
have gradually set forth principles that are most likely to achieve effective fisheries 
management.
2.2 Policy objectives and core attributes of effort 
quota systems
A recent report published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) claims that “well-defined access and user rights, a sound 
scientific basis for decisions of catch and effort levels, effective enforcement, and 
stakeholder involvement in decision-making form the core attributes of effective 
fisheries management regimes”.10 In practise, two main regulatory frameworks 
exist11 to attain an “effective fisheries management regime”, namely, input control 
and output control.12 Most countries use a combination of both controls, while it 
is less common for a major fishing nation to solely implement a comprehensive 
system of input controls, referred to as effort quota management. This type of 
system usually has three core attributes:
1. The system involves sustainability measures, the most important being limit 
on duration of fishing. This limitation is measured in fishing days, normally 
defined as 24 hours from the commencement of a fishing trip. Other sustai-
nability measures relate to technical regulations, such as access to fishing 
areas and usage of fishing gear, as well as regulations on surveillance and 
enforcement.
2. The system contains various participation measures. In this regard, a permit 
scheme is usually set up, that determines who can participate as commercial 
fishermen. As a rule, foreign vessels are either forbidden from participa-
ting in domestic fisheries or their participation is severely restricted. Only 
10. OECD 2011 p. 7.
11. This terminology is used since various technical regulations regarding use of fishing gear 
in certain marine areas and during certain periods is of minor importance in this context. 
These regulations are normally necessary as auxiliary tools to ensure biological protection 
of marine fish stocks but play a minimal role in preventing overharvesting and enhancing 
economic efficiency.
12. Essentially input controls attempt to limit catch indirectly through limits on the amount of 
labour or capital that can be applied to a fishery, while output controls usually establish a pe-
riodic, commonly annual, total allowable catch for a given fish species and close the fishery 
once this level is reached, cf. Sharing the Fish 1999 p. 20.
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permit-holders are allowed to catch fish on a commercial basis. Since there 
are no catch limitations, some restrictions are imposed on permit holders, 
vessel size and type of engine, for example. In order to prevent an increase 
in fleet size, no new fishing vessel can enter the fishing fleet unless another 
vessel or vessels of similar effort capacity are decommissioned. Thus the 
permit scheme has the effect of creating a closed-shop arrangement.
3. The effort quota system entails what may be considered as economic mea-
sures, including rules on the rights of permit holders. Normally the permit 
holder acquires an individual effort quota, that is, a certain number of days 
at sea when he can fish. The cumulative number of individual effort quotas 
cannot exceed the total number of fishing days allocated. The effort quo-
tas may be transferable, and if so, the transfer is usually subject to various 
conditions.
The economic effects of the core attributes of a typical effort quota management 
system have been thoroughly scrutinized over time, and this system is generally 
considered “to lead to inefficient outcomes”.13
2.3 Common flaws of effort quota management systems
The main arguments for an effort quota management system are that the freedom 
of the fishermen is less limited than under a catch quota system, and that fishermen 
are less likely to discard catch. In theory, if the system is well designed it becomes 
less expensive to monitor and enforce than alternative systems, such as a catch 
quota system. However, a typical effort quota management system has inherent 
weaknesses, the principle drawback being the increased risk of overharvesting.
A typical effort quota management system has several ways of controlling and 
reducing effort, e.g. limiting the number of licences, placing restrictions on engine 
power or size and limiting the duration of fishing. However, these measures can 
in most cases be circumvented. From a management perspective, the fishing effort 
system “requires constant adaptation to bring it into line with the latest techno-
logical developments.”14 Hannesson notes that it is often difficult to respond to the 
inevitable ‘technological creep’ in an effort quota system:15
13. Sharing the Fish 1999 p. 115. See also OECD 2013 p. 20.
14. World Ocean Review 1 2010: Fisheries.
15. Hannesson, Rögnvaldur, Privatization of the Ocean, p. 62.
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Experience shows that fishermen expand the capacity of their vessels along uncon-
trolled dimensions … [t]heir ingenuity knows few limits. Dutch fishermen are re-
ported to have circumvented a limit on the power of the main engine by restraining 
it and installing auxiliary engines which could supersede the “main” engine’s power. 
The phrase “capital stuffing” has been coined to describe this phenomenon; a vessel 
hull has certain similarities with a Thanksgiving turkey, which can be stuffed with 
various goodies to enhance its qualities.
The problem of ‘technological creep’ leads to two fundamental defects of a typical 
effort quota management system: overfishing and overcapitalization.16 Moreover, 
an effort quota management system tends to become increasingly complicated, 
leading to overregulation, which in turn makes the system difficult and costly to 
operate.17
3 Management of demersal fisheries in the 
Faroe Islands
3.1 Historical background
The most important demersal stocks within the Faroese EEZ have always been 
cod,18 haddock and saithe. In spite of the extension of the Faroese EEZ to 200 nm 
in 1977, an open-access regime, in combination with various complicated subsidy 
programmes, continued to be the basis of the Faroese domestic fisheries policy. In 
1987, a partial entry/exit scheme for the fishing fleet was introduced.19 For various 
reasons, including poor status of the main fish stocks, the Faroese economy col-
lapsed in the early 1990s.20 Consequently, the Danish government intervened and 
re-financed the foreign debts of the Faroese Home Rule Government upon several 
conditions. One of them was a new fisheries management system. This resulted in 
enactment of the Commercial Fisheries Act (CFA) No. 28/1994.21
In line with the initial provisions of the CFA, a catch quota system was put into 
operation during the period 1994–1996. This meant that the domestic demersal 
16. Sharing the Fish 1999 pp. 118–119; See also Grafton et al. 2005 pp. 700–701.
17. Healey and Hennessey 1998 pp. 109–119 discusses the consequences of using complex man-
agement tools, many of which are similar to that of the Faroese system. See also Arnason 2007 
p. 7 on the cost.
18. The Faroese cod stock is actually divided into two management units, one stock belonging to 
the Faroe Plateau and the other to the Faroe Bank. The Faroe Bank has been closed to all but 
small jiggers since 2009.
19. See Fiskimálaráðið 2007 p. 16; Løkkegaard et al. 2004 p. 60.
20. See for instance FAO.
21. Ibid. See also Løkkegaard et al. 2004 p. 10.
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fisheries in the Faroe Islands were managed with annual TACs where the total 
quota was divided among individual vessels, and the individual catch quotas were 
transferable subject to certain conditions. The system quickly became controver-
sial among key participants in the fishing industry, as well as in other segments 
of society.22 It was consequently abandoned and a new comprehensive effort quota 
management system was designed, following amendments to the original CFA in 
1996.23 The CFA has been amended many times since 1996 but the core attributes 
of the effort quota management system have remained unchanged.
3.2 CFA: Purpose and policy principles
The CFA applies to the utilisation of living marine stocks,24 whether it takes place 
within the Faroese territorial sea or EEZ. The Act also regulates fishing activi-
ties of vessels flying the Faroese flag on the high seas and in other states’ EEZ.25 
Utilisation of living marine stocks is to be conducted in a sustainable and rational 
way, both in biological and economic terms, with due concern for the relationship 
between stocks of plants and animals in the sea and their abundance, in order to 
secure optimal flow of benefits for society, constant employment and income, and 
opportunities for commercial activity all over the Islands.26
Article 2, paragraph 1, line 1 of the CFA reads as follows:27
The living marine stocks in the Faroese marine territory are the property of the 
Faroese people and so are the fishing rights outside that territory, which the Faroese 
Home Rule Government has acquired or is entitled to under international law.
In addition, article 3, paragraph 2 of CFA states that “rights to fish in accordance 
to this law does not provide any entity or individual with a property right”, and 
“rights to fish can be revoked without paying any compensation”.28 It is also stated 
in article 2, paragraph 3 of CFA that “[t]he main principle of managing living 
marine stocks not restricted by international or other agreements that the Faroe 
Islands are bound by is to provide for as much freedom as possible to utilise the 
resource for fishing vessels flying the Faroese flag”.
22. FAO; Løkkegaard et al. 2004 p. 10.
23. See Acts No 50/1996, 64/1996 and 77/1996 that amended the initial provisions of CFA.
24. The concept of living marine stocks relates to fish stocks, crustaceans, molluscs, other inver-
tebrates and any other living marine resource that is not whale, seal, bird or farmed fish.
25. See art. 1 of the Act.
26. See art. 2(1)(2) of the Act.
27. Translation made by the authors. All translations from Faroese to English are made by the 
authors unless otherwise stated.
28. See art. 3(2)(2) of the Act.
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These statutory provisions indicate that the purpose of the CFA is to promote 
sustainable utilisation of the living marine stocks as well as their efficient eco-
nomic utilisation. In this way, constant employment, secure income, and work 
opportunities as well as commercial activities are promoted all over the Islands. 
At the same time the CFA states that the resource belongs to the Faroese people 
and that fishing harvest rights29 are revocable without paying any compensation 
to the holders of those rights. Additionally, fishing should be as free as possible.
Thus the policy objectives sought are to be attained without giving holders of 
fishing harvest rights any legal guarantees over the exclusivity of said rights. The 
current arrangement may be considered to be in line with the idea that the resource 
belongs to the people, not to those who are utilising it, an idea further substanti-
ated by the fact that all fishing harvest rights are due to expire either on 1 January 
2018 or 1 January 2023 (see further, Section 3.4).30
3.3 Division of the fishing fleet
The Faroese fishing fleet broadly speaking may be divided into three parts: vessels 
that harvest in accordance with the domestic effort quota management system, 
industrial trawlers that harvest more or less outside the Faroese maritime territory, 
and the pelagic fleet that harvests both inside and outside the Faroese maritime 
territory. As a general rule, the latter two conduct their fishing under a catch quota 
system, where the individual vessel quotas are transferable, subject to certain con-
ditions. These two vessel groups are not of interest here. The focus of this article is 
solely on the effort quota management system and the vessels that operate within it.
3.4 Fundamental pillars of the system
Since the introduction of a comprehensive effort quota management system for 
the domestic demersal fisheries in 1996, the following have become the core pil-
lars of the system:
 i. The Faroese Parliament (f. Løgtingið) is obliged to amend the CFA annually 
in order to stipulate the total number of fishing days for that year. Before 
this decision is taken, the experts of the Faroese Marine Research Institute 
(MRI) provide the minister in charge with their estimation of the spawning 
stock biomasses of the main fish stocks. On this basis the MRI recommends 
29. In this article the term ‘fishing harvest rights’ will be used broadly, i.e., it refers to conditions 
that must be fulfilled by an individual or an individual entity to engage in commercial fisher-
ies. Normally these conditions include fishing permits and quotas.
30. See art. 7 b (1) of CFA.
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measures required to keep the fishing mortality rate at a sustainable level.31 
The Fishing Day Committee, a special body comprised mainly of fishing 
industry representatives, also makes recommendations on the number of 
fishing days.32 Following these two recommendations, the minister prepa-
res a bill that is presented to Parliament and enacted into law no later than 
August 18th every year. Thus, it is always Parliament that sets the annual 
total fishing days for each fishing year, which commences 1 September and 
ends 31 August.
 ii. In order to conduct commercial fishing, a fisherman has to possess a fish-
ing vessel with a harvesting licence (f. veiðiloyvi).33 Regulations regarding 
harvesting licences create in effect a closed-shop arrangement, i.e. an entry/
exit scheme, which ensures that no new fishing vessels enter the fishing 
fleet unless an existing fishing vessel with a similar capacity is decommis-
sioned.34 In addition to this, a fishing vessel has to have a fishing licence (f. 
fiskiloyvi) that states, inter alia, its allocated fishing days.35 This makes the 
fishing permit system twofold since operators of vessels can hold only one 
harvesting licence but several fishing licences. This underlines the dicho-
tomy between the harvesting licence, which is attached to a vessel for the 
long-term, and the fishing licence, which is only valid within each fishing 
year or other specified fishing period.
 iii. All harvesting licences are due to expire 1 January 2018.36 In addition, all 
fishing licences and any accompanying fishing rights linked with harvesting 
licences, e.g. fishing days, are also due to expire on that day. Nevertheless, 
the government may extend all licences and accompanying fishing rights an 
additional five years.37 There is no statutory assurance of what will happen 
after either 1 January 2018 or 1 January 2023.
31. This recommendation is to be given to Parliament no later than 15 June, c.f. art. 22(2)(1) of 
CFA. In addition to the MRI recommendation, the International Council for the Exploration 
of the Sea (ICES) publishes reports in May or June every year on the status of the demersal 
fish stocks in Faroese waters and future harvesting prospects.
32. This recommendation is to be given to Parliament no later than 22 June, c.f. art. 22(3) of CFA. 
Further rules on the Fishing Day Committee are stipulated in art. 5(10) of CFA.
33. See art. 5(3) of CFA.
34. See art. 8 of CFA.
35. See art. 5(4) of CFA.
36. See art. 7 b (1) of CFA.
37. See art. 7c of CFA.
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 iv. The number of total fishing days is first divided among vessel groups, and 
then amongst individual vessels within each group. Initially all vessels were 
allocated the same number of fishing days. However, since harvesting li-
cences and fishing days are transferable, the distribution of fishing days 
within the various vessel groups is no longer equal among all participants. 
As a rule, transferability of these rights is only permissible within and not 
between vessel groups, and is further restricted in accordance with a variety 
of rules. For instance, aggregation limits are applicable to prevent concen-
tration of ownership over fishing harvest rights.38
These fundamental pillars of the Faroese effort quota management system will be 
scrutinised further in the following sections with regard to three criteria: (1) bio-
logical measures, (2) participation measures, and (3) economic measures.
3.5 Biological measures
The Faroese effort quota management system is premised on the idea that it is 
possible to protect demersal fish stocks and their habitat entirely through input 
regulation. Attempts are made to restrain and control many aspects of the effort 
capacity of the fishing fleet, making total time allotted for fishing very important.
Parliament sets the total allowable fishing days, not the Minister of Fisheries. 
The Faroese Economic Council has highlighted this as being unusual:
Every year, Parliament decides upon the total fishing days in the fishing day system. 
As far as the Economic Council is aware there is no other example in the Western 
world where the political system (Parliament) directly sets the total allowable catch 
or effort, as is done in the Faroes. The standard procedure is that the Ministry of 
Fisheries or another body under its authority decides upon the pressure of the fish 
stocks.39
This rare arrangement is problematic, since political responsibility is shared among 
33 members of Parliament, instead of being delegated to a single body, such as the 
Ministry of Fisheries. As a result, no specific public authority or individual is re-
sponsible (or accountable) for setting and implementing total fishing day decisions 
to ensure sustainable utilisation of the demersal fish stocks within the Faroese 
EEZ. Members of Parliament have significant influence over the final decision. 
This arrangement leaves the system vulnerable to recurrent lobbying pressure 
38. See art. 7a of CFA.
39. Búskaparráðið 2012 p. 24 (authors’ translation).
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from a variety of interest groups, including the commercial fishing industry, and 
systematic rejection of sound scientific advice on catch and effort levels. This last 
claim needs to be further explained.
In 1995, when designing the effort quota management system, it was expected 
that on average the fishing mortality rate (F)40 of cod, haddock and saithe should 
not exceed 0.45.41 Such a biological benchmark has neither been laid in statute nor 
in any further regulation. Furthermore, Parliament has not adopted any guiding 
principle for setting the total number of fishing days.42 The marine scientists of 
the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) have for a long 
time held that a suitable fishing mortality for these three stocks should be much 
lower than 0.45.
Mainly due to overfishing, the three demersal stocks are now considered to be 
in very poor shape. For instance, experts at ICES have recommended a total ban on 
direct haddock fishing for 2014,43 as they have done every year since 2009.44 For the 
cod stock on the Faroe Plateau, ICES recommended that “effort should be reduced 
such that fishing mortality in 2014 will be no more than F = 0.16, corresponding to 
a 69 % reduction in the present fishing mortality”.45 The recommendation for saithe 
was a 46 % reduction in fishing mortality for 2014.46 In spite of such repeated re-
commendations by international marine scientists, and the relatively rapid decline 
of demersal catches within the Faroese EEZ for the past few years, the process of 
deciding fishing days has remained unchanged. For a variety of reasons the current 
system has been unable to sufficiently reduce the number of fishing days to ensure 
sustainable demersal fisheries in the Faroe Islands, and therefore the system has 
by and large been unsuccessful.
Another important assumption behind the current effort quota management 
system has failed to materialize as predicted. When the system was designed, the 
fleet was expected to target the most abundant fish stock for efficiency reasons. In 
theory this would maintain fishing mortality of all stocks at relatively equal levels 
and prevent overharvesting of any one species. However, since the value of cod 
is higher than that of haddock and saithe, individual fishermen are incentivized 
40. According to ICES glossary F is “instantaneous rate of fishing mortality; when fishing and 
natural mortality act concurrently, F is equal to the instantaneous total mortality rate (Z), 
multiplied by the ratio of fishing deaths to all deaths”.
41. Jákupsstovu et al. 2007 p. 731.
42. Fiskimálaráðið 2011 p. 9.
43. ICES Advice 2013: Haddock in Subdivision Vb p. 1.
44. Ibid. p. 6.
45. ICES Advice 2013: Cod in Subdivision Vb1 (Faroe Plateau) p. 1.
46. ICES Advice 2013: Saithe in Division Vb p. 1.
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to catch as much cod as possible, despite its decreasing abundance relative to the 
other two species, ensuring even more pressure on the cod stock. Thus, contrary 
to expectations, “the economic factors seem to be more important than the relative 
abundance of the stocks in determining which species is targeted”.47
Apart from using the effort quota management system to bring about sustain-
able harvesting of the demersal fish stocks, various technical measures have been 
put in place, e.g minimum mesh size, area closures during spawning seasons, and 
area restrictions. Faroese fishing grounds have also been divided into inner and 
outer fishing grounds, with the outer being from 12 to 200 nautical miles. This 
division is in place in part to protect juvenile fish but also to separate vessels using 
different types of gear and their conflicting interests.48 The Fisheries Directorate 
has the authority to enact immediate area closures lasting up to two weeks at a 
time if the number of juveniles of the three main species caught exceeds 30 %. 
The Directorate can for the same reason ban certain types of gear in particular 
areas.49 In addition to these sustainability measures, discarding and misreporting 
of catches is banned50 and a system of surveillance and enforcement is in place.51
3.6 Participation measures
The core aims of the Faroese effort quota management system are to regulate the 
fleet’s total fishing time and to keep the effort capacity of the fleet at a reasonable 
level. In line with these objectives, complicated rules have been promulgated to 
restrain the number of active fishing vessels and their capacity to fish. It also fol-
lows from these objectives that all harvesting rights in the Faroese effort quota 
management system are linked to ownership of a fishing vessel sailing under the 
Faroese flag.52
Participation of foreigners in commercial fishing activity is limited since it is 
not possible to conduct commercial fishing without owning a fishing vessel whose 
home port is in the Faroe Islands. Owners of Faroese vessels must have a perma-
47. ICES Advice 2013: Cod in Subdivision Vb1 (Faroe Plateau) p. 6.
48. Jákupsstovu et al. 2007 p. 731.
49. All these technological measures are explained in Jákupsstovu et al. 2007 p. 731.
50. See art. 10(4) of CFA.
51. Discarding and misreporting of catches is estimated to be a minor problem in Faroese de-
mersal fisheries, c.f. for instance Jákupsstovu et al. 2007 p. 736; ICES Advice 2013: Cod in 
Subdivision Vb1 (Faroe Plateau) p. 4; ICES Advice 2013: Haddock in Subdivision Vb p. 2; ICES 
Advice 2013: Saithe in Division Vb p. 2.
52. See article 7(1) of CFA.
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nent link to the country.53 If a legal entity owns a fishing vessel, it has to be regis-
tered in the country and fulfil various conditions, the most important being that 
at least a two-thirds ownership interest of the legal entity is in the possession of 
persons with a permanent link to the Faroe Islands.54
In accordance with the existing article 28(1) of CFA, the Faroese fishing fleet 
in the effort quota management system is divided into the following main vessel 
groups:
 i) Trawlers (group two).55
 ii) Long-liners, larger than 110 tons (group three).56
 iii) Coastal vessels, larger than 15 tons but smaller than 110 tons (group four).57
 iv) Coastal vessels, smaller than 15 tons and using jigs (group five).
 v) Other vessels (group six).
The current division of the fishing fleet has to be put into historical perspective. 
The division of vessel groups has now changed, e.g. the trawler group was previ-
ously divided into two categories, large single trawlers and pair-trawlers.58 It is also 
worth noting that since 1 January 1995, a moratorium has been in place on issuing 
a larger number of harvesting licences.59 Table 1 shows the number of harvesting 
licences among vessels larger than 15 tons in 1995 and 2011.
53. That permanent link is defined in some detail in the legislation, for instance, the relevant 
owner has to have had a registered legal domicile in the Faroes and been obliged to pay taxes 
in the Faroes for the past two years, c.f. art. 7 (2) of CFA.
54. See further articles 7(3)–7(8) of CFA.
55. Vessel group one has merged with vessel group two so no longer exists.
56. The concept tons is defined in article 5(13) of CFA but it refers either to Gross Tonnage (GT) 
or Gross Register Tonnage (GRT) of the relevant fishing vessel.
57. This vessel group is subdivided into three vessel groups when it comes to allocation of fishing 
days.
58. The traditional trawlers were only allowed to catch demersal fish stocks as by-catch (they were 
not part of the effort quota management system), while pair-trawlers were part of the effort 
quota management system from the outset.
59. See art. 31 of CFA.
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Table 1: Number of harvesting licences of those ﬁshing vessels larger than 15 tons in 1995 
and 2011, divided according to vessel group.60
Vessel group 1995 2011
Trawlers 48 36
Long-liners* 19 20
Coastal vessels from 15–40 tons (long-lining and jigging) 50 21
Coastal vessels larger than 40 tons but smaller than 110 tons 
(long-lining and jigging)
35 22
Coastal vessels larger than 40 tons but smaller than 110 tons 
(trawling)
19 12
Total number 171 111
* In 2005 a change was made with the effect that fishing vessels over 110 tons were defined as large 
long-liners, while vessels smaller than 110 tons were moved to the group of vessels larger than 40 tons 
but smaller than 110 tons. This explains why the number of larger long-liners was higher in 2011 than 
in 1995.
As table 1 indicates, a decrease in the number of vessels larger than 15 tons took 
place between 1995 and 2011. However, the number of allocated harvesting licences 
only indicates how many fishing vessels are active in the vessel groups that need 
harvesting licences to conduct commercial fishing. Fishing vessels below 15 tons 
– those fishing with long-lines or jigs (group five) – have never been required to 
possess such a licence. A fishing licence is sufficient for them to conduct demersal 
fishing.61
The decrease in harvesting licences is not reflective of a concurrent decrease 
in effort capacity; rather, the opposite is more likely the case. Since 1996, Faroese 
vessel operators within the effort quota management system have been permitted 
to renew their vessels. Certain limitations are in place when such renewals oc-
cur, and article 8 of CFA and regulations set in line with that provision cover this 
topic.62 It follows, inter alia, from this regulatory framework, that fishing effort 
capacity shall be calculated based on the size of a vessel and its engine capacity, 
and that the original fishing effort capacity can only be improved by 15 per cent 
and by approval of the Ministry of Fisheries.
These rules apply when an old vessel is replaced while neither in CFA nor in 
government regulations is it explicitly stated that vessel operators are forbidden to 
60. Búskaparráðið 2011 p. 16. See also Fiskimálaráðið 2010 p. 12.
61. See art. 5(3) of CFA, c.f. art. 28(1) of CFA.
62. See for instance Regulation No. 75/2006 on assessment of effort fishing capacity when a fish-
ing licence is transferred between vessels 15 tons and larger, as amended by Regulation No. 
132/2011.
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alter their vessels to increase their effort capacity. This means that vessel operators 
have been able to restructure their vessels in order to increase their effort capacity. 
The authors are not aware of any procedures or steps taken by the government to 
regularly monitor potential changes of each fishing vessel with a harvesting li-
cence, and the effects that such changes might have on its effort capacity. It can be 
concluded that those operating in the effort quota management system in practise 
have been able to increase the effort capacity of their vessels since 1996. In addi-
tion, the number of vessels in vessel group five has, until recently, been limited in 
a relaxed way. This despite the fact that vessel group five has landed a considerable 
portion of the demersal catches, for instance, more than 25 % of the total cod catch 
in the period 2002–2007.63
3.7 Economic measures
Two methods are applied to enhance the economic efficiency of the fishing fleet. 
First, total fishing days are allocated amongst vessel groups and individual vessels. 
Second, individual fishing days are transferable, subject to certain conditions. The 
legal basis of these methods now follows.
The term ‘fishing day’ is defined in article 5(5) of CFA:
One fishing day is each 24 hours that a fishing vessel has been operating at sea dur-
ing the fishing year. Each fishing trip has commenced when the fishing vessel has 
left port and ends when the vessel returns to port. Each commenced fishing trip 
counts for at least 24 hours. For fishing vessels in vessel group 5 in accordance to 
article 28(1), each fishing trip counts as one fishing day even if the trip is longer 
than 24 hours.
One fishing day is 24 hours and each commenced fishing trip counts as at least 24 
hours. A fishing trip starts when a vessel leaves port and ends when it returns to 
port. For vessels in group five, each fishing trip is 24 hours, even if it lasts longer 
than 24 hours. Therefore these vessels are effectively allocated fishing trips, not 
fishing days.
Currently article 28(2) of CFA stipulates, inter alia, how annual total fishing 
days (as a percentage) are to be divided among vessel groups in the three most 
important demersal stocks, see table 2.
63. Fiskimálaráðið 2008 p. 26.
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Table 2: Allocation of ﬁshing days among vessel groups, measured in percentages.
Vessel group/stock Cod Haddock Saithe
Trawlers (group two) 25 % 12 % 82 %
Long-liners, larger than 110 tons (group three) 37 % 45 % 0
Coastal vessels, larger than 15 tons but smaller 
than 110 tons (group four)
17 % 17.5 % 11.5 %
Coastal vessels, smaller than 15 tons, catching by 
jigging (group five)
20 % 23.5 % 6 %
Other vessels (group six) 1 % 2 % 0.5 %
These long-term allocation keys have remained more or less the same since 1996.64 
In principle, the initial allocation of fishing days to vessel groups was based on 
the average amount of effort utilised per day in the period 1985–1994.65 The main 
allocation criterion was based on past participation of economic operators, what 
may be termed ‘grandfathering’. The principle has been to distribute the number of 
fishing days equally among individual vessels within vessel groups two, three and 
four. However, this division is no longer equal since fishing days are transferable 
subject to certain conditions, both during the fishing year and for the long term.
Owners in vessel group five have traditionally been divided into two, commer-
cial fishermen and recreational fishermen, where the latter are greater in number 
than the former. Allocation of fishing days in vessel group five has been based 
on premises different from those of vessel groups two, three, and four. First, the 
fishing days belonging to the entire vessel group are divided so that full-time fish-
ermen receive 60 % and recreational 40 %. Second, each professional fisherman 
acquires a certain number of fishing days, while recreational fishermen have a 
joint pool of fishing days, with the effect that recreational fishermen have to stop 
fishing when the total number of fishing days has expired, although in practice 
all fishing days are rarely used.66
All vessels in groups two, three, and four can transfer harvesting licences, al-
beit only within their own vessel group.67 Therefore, a vessel without a harvesting 
licence can replace a vessel with a licence, or the harvesting licence of an existing 
vessel can merge with another vessel with the effect that two harvesting licences 
64. In this context one has to bear in mind that ‘[s]ome vessels may move from one fleet to another 
by changing gears’, c.f. Jákupsstovu et al. 2007 p. 731. Thus, some flexibility has been allowed 
for owners of vessels to change the vessel group status of the vessel.
65. See further Jákupsstovu et al. 2007 p. 731.
66. Fiskimálaráðið 2007 p. 55.
67. See art. 8(1)(2) of CFA.
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become one. All fishing rights associated with the harvesting licence, including 
fishing days, continue to be attached to the vessel holding the licence. The princi-
pal condition for transferring harvesting licences is that the recipient vessel does 
not have a higher effort capacity than the vessel from which the licence was trans-
ferred.68 Additional restrictions apply, e.g. a harvesting licence may not be trans-
ferred from a vessel smaller than 15 tons to a larger vessel, and vice versa. The same 
regulations apply to transfers of harvesting licences to a vessel less than 110 tons, 
and vice versa (i.e. between vessels in different sub-groups in vessel group four). 
Since vessel group five is not required to have harvesting licences, the aforemen-
tioned rules in principle do not apply to them.
From the outset, it has been permissible within the Faroese effort quota man-
agement system to transfer individual fishing days. Long-term transfers and trans-
fers within the fishing year are allowed. The conditions for fishing day transfers 
are stipulated in article 14 of the CFA, and regulations set in accordance with 
that provision of the Act. The following main principles can be deduced from the 
regulations:
 i) Fishing day transfers can principally only take place within each vessel 
group. Only owners of vessels that utilised 60 % of their fishing days in the 
previous fishing year are permitted to transfer fishing days, permanently 
and within the fishing year.
 ii) It is forbidden to transfer fishing days from a vessel with a fishing licence 
that uses long-lines or jigs to a vessel using trawl, and vice versa. This means 
it is forbidden to transfer fishing days from two of the sub-vessel groups 
within vessel group four, i.e. from those that use long-lines or jigs to those 
that use trawl.
 iii) When three months are left of a fishing year, fishing days for that fishing 
year only can be transferred between vessel groups, subject to certain con-
ditions.69 In order to estimate the change in effort capacity when fishing 
days are transferred between vessel groups – and therefore vessels with dif-
ferent effort capacities – complicated rules apply for measuring the number 
of fishing days of any given transaction. For instance, 18 fishing days for a 
68. See art. 8(1)-(3) of CFA.
69. However, a vessel with a fishing licence for long-lining or jigging cannot transfer its fishing 
days to a vessel with a fishing licence to use trawl (group two and a sub-vessel group of vessel 
group four).
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long-liner in vessel group four may be equivalent to six fishing days for a 
long-liner in vessel group three.70
 iv) The recipient vessel naturally gains an increase in its long-term proportional 
fishing day rights after a permanent transfer of fishing days, though the ac-
tual number of fishing days may vary from one year to another, depending 
upon the total number of fishing days allocated to each vessel group.
 v) Aggregation limits are in place to prevent a concentration of ownership 
in fishing vessels with a high level of fishing days attached to them. For 
instance, as a general principle, persons who are involved in commercial 
fisheries are not allowed to hold more than 20 % of the total fishing days in 
vessel groups two, three, and four. However, fishing days can be transferred 
so that they exceed the above but only for one fishing year at a time.71
3.8 Policy outcomes – summary
As demonstrated, the main domestic demersal stocks within Faroese maritime 
territory are currently estimated to be in a poor state. The spawning stock bio-
masses of the most important stocks are currently at low levels and fishing mor-
tality has generally been excessive since 1996.72 The on-going sustainability crisis 
is described and analysed in a report published by the Faroese Economic Council 
in the autumn of 2012:73
The procedure of the parliament [sic] stipulating an annual maximum of allowed 
days-at-sea across the varying groups of fishing boats has proven to be nearly impos-
sible to manage sustainably. Case in point, although the number of days-at-sea in the 
system has gone down by more than 50 per cent since 1996–1997, the effort on the 
cod stock on the Faroe Shelf is still above the recommendations of marine biologists.
In addition to the sustainability issues presented here, ‘technological creep’ appears 
to be unavoidable. The Faroese Economic Council describes the phenomenon in 
the following way:74
… the fishing fleet will become more efficient through improved technology and 
equipment, in spite of the fishing fleet remaining the same size (or even decreasing). 
70. See Regulation No. 3/2011 on transfer of fishing days, as amended by Regulation No. 134/2011.
71. See further, art. 7 of CFA.
72. ICES Advice 2013: Cod in Subdivision Vb1 (Faroe Plateau); ICES Advice 2013: Haddock in 
Subdivision Vb; ICES Advice 2013: Saithe in Division Vb.
73. Faroese Economic Council 2012 p. 23. Original in English.
74. Faroese Economic Council 2012 p. 23.
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This should also give rise to a gradual decrease in days-at-sea. These unfortunate 
characteristics make it almost impossible to sustainably manage the fishery.
Apart from failing to ensure reasonable policy outcomes by implementing sustain-
ability and participation measures within the Faroese effort quota management 
system, vessel groups within the system have struggled financially. The Faroese 
Economic Council sums up the economic situation of the domestic fishing fleet 
in the following manner:75
“The profitability in the domestic fleet has for many years been poor due to fisheries 
being affected by the historically poor state of many important fish stocks – caused 
by high fishing intensity and effort … The poor results of the fisheries in Faroese 
waters are costly for the Faroese economy. The total catches of cod on the Faroe Shelf 
has since 2004 been around 10,000 tons annually. This is well below the 100-year 
average of 25,000 tons annually.”
4 The future
Whatever the reasons, it is obvious that the Faroese effort quota management sys-
tem has failed. The policy failures pose two fundamental questions for the future 
of demersal fisheries management in the Faroe Islands. First, are there any legal 
barriers against radically altering the system or even adopting a new one? Second, 
is it likely that Faroese policy makers will opt for radically changing the manage-
ment of the demersal fisheries within the Faroese maritime territory? Some light 
will now be shed on these two questions.
4.1 Legal issues – can things change?
The Faroe Islands are a part of the Kingdom of Denmark and therefore the prop-
erty protection clause of the Danish Constitution applies.76 This constitutional 
provision offers holders of fishing harvest rights legal protection if it is determined 
that these rights fall under the term ‘property’. Traditionally this term has been 
interpreted widely, having, inter alia, the effect that “commercial rights acquired 
directly under legislation or under a public licence are protected”.77 Accordingly, 
this constitutional provision at some extent safeguards the rights to harvest marine 
fish stocks for commercial purposes in the Faroe Islands. However, these rights 
75. Ibid. p. 20.
76. The wording of article 73(1) of the Danish Constitution is as follows: “The right of property 
shall be inviolable. No person shall be ordered to cede his property except where required in 
the public interest. It can be done only as provided by Statute and against full compensation.”
77. Jensen 2007 p. 124.
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are neither irrevocable nor immutable78 since “rights based on public law enjoy a 
lower degree of protection than rights based on private law”.79
In principle, the legislature has a wide margin within which to alter the na-
ture of fishing harvest rights, without compensating the holders of those rights. 
However, such radical changes would need to be laid down in statutory legislation 
and supported by public interest considerations. Nevertheless, the CFA protects 
the interests of fishing harvest rights holders until 1 January 2018. Thus, prior to 
2018, the legislature has limited scope to remove the rights without compensat-
ing rights holders.
However, this conclusion does not necessarily stand up under close examina-
tion. For instance, if a new management system were to be adopted prior to this 
date, such as a catch quota system, and the interests of fishing harvest rights hold-
ers were protected by allocating them fishing harvest rights in the new system, 
then such a policy change does not necessarily violate the property rights of the 
fishing harvest rights holders. It is also clear that the Faroese legislature can, in 
the interests of protecting the fish stocks, temporarily ban all fishing for some fish 
species. This is possible to implement without paying any compensation to holders 
of fishing harvest rights.
In this context it is also important to bear in mind that the aforementioned 
articles 2 and 3 of the CFA lay down policy principles that underline the public 
nature of the resource, and that rights of use do not amount to traditional prop-
erty. These policy principles strengthen even further the latitude of the legislature 
to radically change a fisheries management scheme that has failed to achieve its 
declared policy objectives.
4.2 Policy issues – will things change?
The small size of the Faroese population makes policy-making in the critical area 
of fisheries management difficult. It is invariably affected by the fact that when 
fishing days are adjusted or regulatory changes are implemented, politicians are 
interfering with the interests of individuals, legal entities, and communities, and 
these groups are likely to use their lobbying power to steer the political process in 
their favour. In this context, it is helpful to recall that many members of Parliament 
over the years have had strong ties to the fishing industry. If powerful forces within 
the industry are opposed to any radical changes of the management scheme, al-
ternative solutions become difficult to implement politically.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid. Property rights issues in the context of Faroese fisheries management is briefly discussed 
in Fiskimálaráðið 2007 p. 8–9; Hansen and Jákupsstovu 2010 p. 10; Fiskimálaráðið 2012a p. 7.
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Marine fishing is more than an industry to the Faroese. Exploiting ocean re-
sources is seen as an intrinsic part of being Faroese to almost everyone, young and 
old alike. This explains in part why the views of marine scientists on the status of 
the fish stocks are generally not considered to carry any more weight than those 
of fishermen, vessel owners and politicians. Members of Parliament, who set the 
total allowable fishing days, do not necessarily interpret it as a major resource 
crisis when international marine scientists many years in a row suggest a serious 
reduction in fishing mortality rate of the demersal fish stocks be undertaken to 
ensure the sustainability of the three main species. Politicians may simply not be-
lieve that stock reductions stem from overfishing but rather result from changes 
in the environment. From this perspective a radical overhaul of the effort quota 
management system seems unlikely.
The continuing depletion of the demersal fish stocks within the Faroese mari-
time territory may have serious economic consequences. Even though the situation 
has been mitigated temporarily in light of the boom in the Faroese pelagic fisheries 
over the last few years, and the fast-growing fish farming industry, it is not ac-
ceptable in the long run for operators in the domestic demersal fisheries industry 
on average to be losing money on their commercial activities. Eventually some 
measures will have to be implemented to correct this situation. It is this growing 
necessity that is most likely to persuade Faroese policy-makers to develop solu-
tions that will function to achieve the desired policy objectives of sustainable and 
profitable demersal fisheries.
5 Conclusions
The present analysis has argued throughout that the policy outcomes of the Faroese 
effort quota management system are both poor and unsatisfactory. International 
experts estimate that the main demersal fish stocks within the Faroese maritime 
territory are at historic lows, an estimate that has been consistent for some years 
now. Although some amendments may be made to the system in order to maintain 
fishing mortality at a reasonable rate, individual harvesters are likely to find ways 
to increase their effort capacity. This ‘technological creep’ is difficult to avoid in 
such a management system.
In light of the poor policy outcomes, the Faroese government should, in princi-
ple, be able to make radical changes to the effort quota system, or even abolish it. 
Current holders of fishing harvest rights cannot justifiably expect societal institu-
tions to remain idle while the domestic demersal fishing industry continues in its 
current trajectory of terminal decline. Yet it is legitimate to take into account the 
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fact that current holders of fishing harvest rights should have reasonable expecta-
tions of continuing their economic operations.
Changing the effort quota system will not be easy for the Faroese. While it is not 
possible to isolate a specific cause of the overall failure of the system, it ultimately 
comes down to the inability of the political apparatus to limit access to the resource 
and participants’ desire to maximize their own share. The Faroese feel they have 
an inherent right to fish. This is reflected in the many choices made throughout 
the political process, leading to a system where few, if any, are held accountable. 
Accordingly, the difficult policy decisions necessary to ensure sustainable and 
profitable fisheries have quite simply not been made.
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